Income Tax Evasion and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination by Peterson, Bruce
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 1 Issue 1 
1964 
Income Tax Evasion and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination 
Bruce Peterson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce Peterson, Income Tax Evasion and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination, 1 Tulsa L. J. 7 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol1/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
INCOME TAX EVASION AND TUE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Bruce Peterson*
"Really, now you ask me," said Alice,
very much confused, "I don't think-"
"Then you shoulddt talk," said the Hatter.
Alice in Wonderland
by Lewis Carroll
The privilege against self-incrimination has had a long and il-
lustrious history as a part of the English law. In American juris-
prudence we find it's embodiment in the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.1 Chief Justice John Marshall in an early decision
stated the scope of the privilege thusly:
*B.S., 1949, LL.B., 1952, Univer- "Many links frequently compose
sity of Oklahoma; LL.M., 1959, that chain of tesimony, which
New York University; Dean, Uni-
versity of Tulsa School of Law; is necessary to convict any indi-
member, Oklahoma and American vidual of a crime. It appears to
Bar Associations. the court to be the true sense of
the rule that no witness is compellable to furnish any one of
them against himself. It is certainly not only a possible but a
p'robable case that a witness, by disclosing a single fact, may
complete the testimony against himself, and to every effectual
purpose accuse himself as entirely as he would by stating
every circumstance which would be required for his conviction.
That fact of itself might be unavailing, but all other facts
without it would be insufficient."2
Nowhere is this summation more applicable than in the field
of taxation. A bit of information can quickly fill in a "net worth"
investigation where the taxpayer failed to disclose all of his income.
Yet, on the other side of the coin, an efficacious tax system must
1
'No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . ." U. S. CoNsT. amend. V.
21 Burr's Trial 244 (1808), United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40
(No. 14,692d) (C.C. Va. 1807).
1
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by its very nature see to it that there is a continuous flow of in-
formation relative to the status of compliance with the taxing laws.
Because of its pervasive nature, perhaps no other phase of the law
has a more direct impact on so vast a number of people.
Since the birth of the modem income tax in 1913, not only
have the rates multiplied, but also the number of taxpayers. The
combination of high rates, coupled with taxpayer knowledge that
not all returns are audited, plus the American gambling spirit has
led one author to speculate on the advent of a new national pastime
called "Treasury Roulette."3 While the number of petty infractions
is more than likely quite high, substantial evasion is deterred by the
criminal sanctions imposed by the Internal Revenue Code. The
principal provision is found in Section 7201 making it a felony,
punishable by a fine up to $10,000 or imprisonment up to five years,
or both, "wilfully" to attempt "in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax . .. or the payment thereof . . . ."4 The statute of limi-
tations is six years.6 Section 7203 sets forth misdemeanor offenses,
punishable by fines up to $10,000 and imprisonment for not more
than one year, or both, for willful failure to make a return, "keep
any records, or supply any information" required by law or regu-
lations. The statute of limitations is three years as to misdemeanors.0
Even though the number of criminal prosecutions is not large
in comparison to the number of taxpayers, the threat of ilnprison-
ment is undoubtedly the greatest single deterrent to willful evasion.
Fines, penalties and interest when weighed against tax-free income
are simply inadequate. The number of prosecutions for willful
evasion of income taxes has increased notably over the past decade.7
Even so, the prison terms have been comparatively light compared
with those meted out for such other financial offenses as larceny
and embezzlement. But the fact nonetheless remains, that even the
lightest of prison sentences is the single most effective deterrent to
willful tax evasion.
The number of devices utilized to willfully evade the payment
of taxes is few in number, the variations occurring in degree only.
Normally tax evasion is uncovered through routine audits conducted
by revenue agents. Suspicious circumstances revealed during the
audit are turned over to the Intelligence Division. If, upon review,
3 Butler, Income-Tax Fraud - Basic Principles for the General Prac-
titioner, 37 ORE. L. B1Ev. 199 (1958).
4 INT. JIM. CODE OF 1954, § 7201.
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6531(2).
6 INT. PE r. CODE OF 1954 § 6531.
7 In 1949, the government tried 356 taxpayers for willful tax evasion
and got 346 convictions or guilty pleas. See, AmmucAN B,ui AssocLboN
SECTION ON TAXATION, SYrmwosrum nr T.x FRAuD CASES 17 (1950). In
1962, of all criminal cases reaching the courtroom for willful evasion of
federal taxes, 5,263 defendants pleaded gilty or nolo contedere, 866 were
convicted after trial, 402 were acquitted and 760 were either nol-prossed
or dismissed. AtNAL REPORT OF THE Coi&NnssroNmn OF ITErraNAL REVmN,
44 (1962).
EVol. 1, No. 1
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they are deemed sufficient to warrant an investigation a Special
Agent from the Intelligence Division is assigned to the case. If the
case, as it is developed, involves the willful evasion of taxes the
Internal Revenue Service will recommend prosecution. The final
determination lies with the Tax Division of the Justice Department.
Undoubtedly, great weight is accorded the recommendations of
the Service, however, there may be underlying policy considera-
tions as to whether an individual case is acutally prosecuted. In-
asmuch as these are criminal prosecutions brought in the United
States District Courts, all of the constitutional protections are avail-
able to the taxpayer indicted for the willful evasion of taxes.8
Two facets of the audit or investigation of taxpayers need to
be stressed. First, the fusion of the civil aspects of a routine audit
of the taxpayer and that of an investigation that may ultimately lead
to criminal prosecution. In a vast majority of cases no distinguish-
able line of demarcation exists to differentiate when a civil investi-
gation fades into a criminal investigation. Secondly is the uncon-
troverted fact that almost every conceivable fact is relevant in an
investigation involving willful tax evasion. Even the most innocu-
ous question may form a link in the chain of evidence necessary to
complete a case for criminal prosecution. In the construction of a
taxpayer's income for a period through the use of the "net worth"
method, the most insignificant scrap is of, or is capable of, damn-
ing consequences. 9
Thus it becomes quite apparent that one of the chief safe-
guards a taxpayer may turn to during an investigation for possible
tax evasion is the Fifth Amendments privilege against self-
incrimination. The Justice Department has compiled a very success-
ful record in prosecutions of this type, partly because only those
cases with an overavhelming possibility of conviction are tried by
the government. Glib taxpayers more often than not contribute to
the overwhelming possibility of conviction classification of their
cases.
10
While the privilege against self-incrimination remains as the
greatest single weapon in the taxpayer's arsenal of defense, the ar-
mor is not without chinks through which prison sentences may
blow. One such chink may best be termed the "required records
8 These are: due process of law, security from unreasonable search or
seizure, the independent judgments of grand jury, trial by jury, privilege
against self-incrimination, a speedy and public trial, confrontation with the
witnesses against him, the right to have the assistance of counsel, the right
and freedom from excessive fines, cruel or unusual punishments and double
jeopardy.
9 The Tax Court gives an excellent picture of the net-worth method in
J. Baker Bryan, 20 P-H TAx CT MFAn 51313 (1951). See also, Avaldan,
Net Worth Computations as Proof of Tax Evasion, 10 TAx L. REv. 431(1955).
2OLyon, The Crime of Income Tax Frauds: Its Present Status and
Function, 53 COLUm. L. RBv. 476, 487 (1953).
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doctrine," although there has been scant use of it by the Internal
Revenue Service to date.
THE REQUIRED RECORDS DOCTRINE
Born of World War II and the O.P.A. was the 1948 case of
Shapiro v. United States.11 In a sharply divided five-to-four opinion
the Supreme Court held -that a statutory requirement that records
be maintained, removed the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination as to these records. The Court reasoned that the
privilege extended only to records that the accused had a right to
withhold, and did not extend to records that the statute compelled
him to maintain. The records thus could be labeled "semi-public"
or "quasi-official" in nature and beyond the scope of the privilege.
The Shapiro case, while not involving income, estate or gift
taxes, does take on sizeable proportions in the tax field when viewed
against the background of Section 6001 and others of the Internal
Revenue Code.12 Section 6001 provides that "every person. .
shall keep such records, render such statements, make such re-
turns, and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary
or his delegate may from time to time prescribe . . . to show
whether or not such person is liable for tax under this title."
The privilege against self-incrimination can and does operate
most effectively in the field of taxation, as well as other regulatory
areas. However, it must be realized that any widespread resort on
the part of a substantial number of taxpayers to the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination would undoubtedly seri-
ously jeopardize, if not cause a complete breakdown in the
continuous audit and investigation program carried on by the
Internal Revenue Service. Congress has resorted to the passage of
immunity" acts in other areas of the law to cope with the privilege
against self-incrimination as an obstacle to the flow of information
necessary for regulation and fact finding.1 3
It should be noted that in the Shapiro case the only require-
ment imposed by the Court on the statutory record keeping doctrine
was that the "basic activity" come within the legitimate scope of
11335 U.S. 1, 68 Sup.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948). For an excel-
lent discussion of the withdrawal of the privilege against self-incrimination
from records required by law see Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran
Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. or Cur. L. PInv. 687
(1951).12 IN r. R v. CoDE oF 1954 §§ 6001, 7602 & 7604. Section 6001 re-
lates to the kind or type of record required to be kept while § 7602 provides
"For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return . . . the
Secretary ... is authorized - (1) to examine any books, papers, records,
or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry;. . ." Sec-
tion 7604 pertains to the jurisdiction of the district courts and enforcement
of summons under § 7602.
13 Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice:
Treading the Constitutional Tightrope, 72 YALE L. J. 1568 (1963).
E~rol. 1, No. I
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Congressional regulation. The statutory language in the Code pro-
viding that taxpayers must keep adequate records for the deter-
mination of their tax liability would appear to fall well within this
restriction of the Shapiro case without distorting the rule itself. Even
though the Internal Revenue Service has not pressed for adoption
of the "required records" doctrine in those tax cases involving the
privilege against self-incrimination, nontheless several courts have
taken the bit in their teeth and used the rule to justify the dis-
closure of taxpayer records.
The first case to follow Shapiro in the tax field was decided
by the Fifth Circuit in 1953.14 It is somewhat anomalous that the
case is correctly decided, but for the wrong reason. The govern-
ment sought, by subpoena, the disclosure of certain records be-
longing to the taxpayer, but in the hands of his accountant. The
accountant refused to comply with the subpoena, raising the privi-
lege against self-incrimination in behalf of his client. The court,
in rejecting the accountant's defense, cited the Shapiro case as au-
thority for its holding. It is suggested that a sounder basis for the
result would have been to rely on the rule that the privilege is
personal to the taxpayer and cannot be pled by a third party on
his behalf.'5
In 1955 a District Court in Georgia held that where an attorney
held records reflecting the gross amount of wagers taken by his
client, the attorney could not refuse to produce these records rely-
ing on the attorney-client privileged communication.'0 The court
reasoned that even if the taxpayer was in possession of these rec-
ords, he could not have refused their inspection by the Internal
Revenue Service as "they involved records which the law requires
to be kept." Thus the taxpayer could not insulate these "required
records" from inspection by placing them in the hands of his at-
torney. The court rejected the attorney's claim that these records
were protected as privileged or confidential communications be-
tween client and attorney and then went on to opine that even had
the attorney raised the privilege against self-incrimination on behalf
of his client that also would have been of no avail.
In 1960 the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Clancy17 upheld
the conviction of a taxpayer for evasion of federal wagering taxes.
The court held that a seizure of the taxpayer's books and accounts
by federal revenue agents did not violate either the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments because, inter aria, they were records that the tax-
payer was required by law to keep and to make available to internal
revenue officials. The court was careful to point out that these were
14 Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953); See Note,
32 TExAs L. REv. 453 (1954).15 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 71 Sup.Ct. 438, 9 L.Ed.
344 (1951).16 United States v. Willis, 145 F.Supp. 365 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
'7 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960).
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not private records subject to the privilege against self-
incrimination.
The foregoing cases, while not overwhelming in number, are
at least an entering wedge in the tax field of the "required records"
doctrine. The Shapiro court invoked long-standing principles when
it stated:
" ... the privilege which exists as to private papers cannot
be maintained in relation to 'records required by law to be
kept in order that there may be suitable information of trans-
actions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental
regulation, and the enforcement of restrictions validly esta-
blished.'"- 8
Thus it would appear, not withstanding some writers in the
field, that the "required records" doctrine has a good foundation in
law upon which a workable theory can be introduced into the col-
lection of taxes.19 Chief Justice Vinson's sole limitation in the
Shapiro case was that the basic activity be one properly within the
scope of Congressional regulation. I would add one more limitation
so that the Fifth Amendment protection as to self-incrimination
would not become a hollow mockery. Records, required by statute
to be maintained, should be limited to a specified purpose, i.e., the
correctness of the taxpayer's income tax liability as disclosed on his
return. These records should not be available for inspection or
audit for the purpose of prosecution under the Robinson-Patman
Act 20 or the anti-trust laws. In other words, use by the government
of records required to be kept under the Internal Revenue Code
would, or should, be restricted for that purpose alone and utiliza-
tion of these records for any other purpose would be subject to a
motion to suppress their introduction into evidence.
Concomitant with the ever-increasing costs of national and
local government and the correlation with an increased tax burden
on a large segment of our population it is imperative that each
citizen taxpayer pay his fair share. The recent legislation concern-
ing the so-called "T. & E." deductions is an illustration of an
aroused majority passing restrictive and punitive type legislation
in an effort to prevent a small minority from abusing the tax law.2 1
If taxpayer cooperation on the scale presently known is going to
continue we must insure that insofar as possible all persons pay
18 335 U.S. at 33, 68 Sup.Ct. at 1392, 92 L.Ed, at 1807.
19 See Redlich, Searches, Seizures and Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases,
10 TAx L. BREv. 191 (1955).
20Clayton Act as amended, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1952).
21Specifically I-r. REv. CODE or 1954 § 274. For a succinct sketch
of the underlying factors and the resultant effects of the changes in the
travel and entertainment provisions of the Revenue Act of 1962, see Horn,
Travel and Entertainment Expense Reporting Under the Revenue Act of
1962, 40 TAxEs 1058 (1962).
[Vol. 1, No. 1
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their just share of the tax burden. Not only this, but the citizenry
must be aware that such an effort is being made by the taxing
officials.
Within recent years the privilege against self-incrimination
in the tax field has ranged beyond the "required records" doctrine
and into other equally vital aspects of the law. Quite often the
question before the court turns on who may properly raise the
question of self-incrimination. This can be sub-divided into two
situations, one where a third party pleads the privilege in behalf
of another, and secondly where the taxpayer has in his possession
records and books of an organization of which he is an officer or
employee.
WHO MAY PLEAD THE PRIVILEGE
The privilege against self-incrimination has been available only
to the person who would be incriminated. This characterization
that the privilege is intensely personal is best typified by the state-
ment of the Court in Hale v. Hinkle:
"The right of a person under the 5th Amendment to refuse
to incriminate himself is purely a personal privilege of the
witness. It was never intended to permit him to plead the fact
that some third person might be incriminated by his testimony,
even though he were the agent of such person."22
Even assuming that the privilege is personal in nature, the ques-
tion of whether an attorney may plead the privilege against self-
incrimination for -his client has never been specifically answered by
the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately the few cases that have been presented to the
inferior courts on this question of the attorney's raising the privilege
on behalf of his client, have been superimposed on some rather
sophisticated property concepts. The pattern has developed, with
some variations, that the taxpayer's accountant has prepared work
papers during the normal preparation of returns for the client over
the years. The taxpayer comes under investigation for possible
income tax evasion and either the accountant turns over these work-
ing papers to the taxpayer, who in turn transmits them to his attor-
ney, or the accountant turns them over to the taxpayer's attorney.23
In Application of House04 the federal district court was faced
with an application by the Internal Revenue Service to enforce a
subpoena for the production of certain documents. The subpoena
was served on the taxpayers' attorneys and demanded production
22 Hale v. Hinlde, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70, 26 Sup.Ct. 370, 377, 50 L.Ed.
652., 663 (1906).23 As to the other side of the coin respecting accountants and the
confidential communication privilege see Fahey, Testimonial Privilege of
Accountants in Federal Tax Fraud Investigations, 17 TAX L. REV. 491 (1962).
24144 F.Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
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of accountant's work papers which had, at the request of the tax-
payers, been delivered to such attorneys. The court denied en-
forcement of the subpoena, holding valid the taxpayers' refusal,
voiced by their attorneys, to produce such documents in reliance
on the privilege against self-incrimination.
In so holding, the Court stated that the work papers were "the
property of the taxpayers," 5 but then went on to say that the Fifth
Amendment does not turn on any "narrow concept of property law;"
and that it could be effectively pled if the taxpayers or their at-
torneys were "in rightful, indefinite possession of the documents."20
The district court of New Jersey in United States v. Boccuto27
refused to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination as to work
papers turned over to the attorney by the taxpayer's accountant.
The court concluded that the work papers were the property of
the accountant, not the taxpayer, therefore the attorney could not
plead the privilege against self-incrimination on behalf of his client.
It is submitted that this slavish adherence to property concepts in
an area such as this serves no useful purpose, but further muddies
already murky waters unnecessarily.
Judge Madden, in the Boccuto case relies in part on dicta ap-
pearing in the Willis opinion 28 regarding whether the attorney can
claim for the client the privilege against self-incrimiation. The
first point made in the Willis case is that "The mere assertion of
privilege does not immunize him . ... 29but that the court must
then pass on the correctness of the assertion that disclosure of such
information might tend-to incriminate. The second point touched
on by the court is stated thusly:
'When we are dealing not with communications as to which
the attorney has full knowledge but with the broad field of
self-incrimination, the attorney speaking for an absent client
with whom he probably has been unable to communicate can
hardly be presumed to be well enough informed either to de-
cide for the client whether the client would, if present, elect to
claim the privilege or to support the claim when made."3 0
In a rather tersely worded opinion by the Eighth Circuit in
251d. at 102.
261d. at 101.
27175 F.Supp. 886 (D. N.J.), appeal dismissed 274 F.2d 860 (3rd
Cir. 1959).2 8 United States v. Willis, 145 F.Supp. 365, 368 (M.D. Ga. 1955).
29145 F.Supp. at 368. Until the taxpayer becomes a defendant in
an action for willful evasion of income taxes the court must pass on thejustification of his refusal. Just when the taxpayer ceases to be a suspect
and becomes a defendant in a criminal action has generated a good deal
of litigation, not only in the tax field, but the criminal lawv generally.
United States v. Lawn, 115 F.Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also Lipton,
Safeguarding Constitutional Rights in Tax Fraud Investigations, 32 TAXES
263 (1954). at 368.
30 145 F.Supp.at38
[Vol. 1, No. 1
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Bouschor v. United States,31 a case almost identical in nature to
that of Application of House32, the court rejected the House ration-
ale and cited with approval the Boccuto decision based on the
property concepts enunciated therein. About the only comment one
could make on disarray of the authorities on this question was that
there was some authority for either side.
The Ninth Circuit had pending an almost identical case at
the time Bouschor was decided by the Eighth Circuit. judge
Jertberg of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Judson3 in a
well thought out opinion reviewed the cases in the field and
came to the same conclusions as Judge Murphy in Application
of House, but not without a sharp dissenting opinion. What
went unsaid in Application of House as to the dangers inherent
in what the government urged upon the courts, Judge Jertberg
sums up in the closing paragraph of his opinion:
"The government has at its disposal inquisitorial powers and
administrative procedures which it may invoke at its pleas-
ure. If the government's position were sustained here, those
powers could be utilized to stimulate a taxpayer's consulta-
tion with his attorney and the predictable transfer of his
records. The government's powers could then be utilized
to compel disclosure of those matters by the attorney when-
ever the taxpayer were not available to utter the magic
words. In our judgment, the inherent power thus to compel
indirectly an individuals self-incrimination is curbed by the
Fifth Amendment as effectively as the power to compel the
same result directly."34
It is the sincere hope that the rationale of the Judson case
will prevail over the Bouschor-Boccuto-Willis reasoning. To em-
asculate the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimin-
ation through the use of tenuous property concepts and strict
construction of the personal element in the privilege itself does a
dis-service to the freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution.
In each of the foregoing cases the attorney was the sole party
to the proceedings, the subpoena being directed to the attorney
to produce the papers without the taxpayer being made a party.
The better rule might be to limit the claim of the privilege by
the attorney on behalf of his client to those cases where the client
is not made a party until this is done and the court may properly
pass on the justification of the privilege with the client as a party
to the proceedings.
31316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
82 In both the Bouschor and House cases the accountants work papers
had been turned over to the taxpayer's counsel at the direction of the tax-
payer. In both instances the court finds that technically the work papers
are the property of the accountants as only possession is surrendered.
33 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
34 Id. at 468.
9
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The second facet of this problem of who may claim the
privilege against self-incrimination concerns the dichotomy of
what is a "private" record as distinguished from a record or paper
held in a custodial capacity for an organization.
PRIVATE OR PERSONAL RECORDS
The seminal decision of depersonalized group records is the
1911 Supreme Court case of Wilson v. United States."' The Court
here held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination did not extend its protection to corporations or to corporate
officials when compelled to produce corporate documents which
tend to incriminate themselves. This doctrine was extended to
unincorporated associations such as labor unions in the case of
United States v. White.36 The rationale of these decisions is that
the state has reserved visitorial power over the conduct of certain
organizations and that they have a "character so impersonal in the
scope of their membership and activities that it cannot be said
to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests
of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group
interests only."37 The labor union represented organized institu-
tional activity as contrasted with wholly individual activity and
therefore there was no personal privilege available to its officers
of records in their possession.
In 1963 the Second Circuit extended this doctrine to limited
partnerships in United States v. Silverstein. 8 The court points
out that the limited partners are similar to small corporate share-
holders and that the limited partners have "the right to have the
partnership books kept at the principal place of business, and to in-
spect and copy them."3 9 Also seized upon as significant in the
Silverstein case is the fact that limited liability was sought by the
organization and this was tantamount to an election by the partners,
both general and limited, to submit to a greater degree of govern-
mental intervention.
It is submitted that the first factor emphasized by the
Silverstein case regarding a centralized repository for records
would be true of both a limited and general partnership arrange,
ment. The second factor of limited liability would be absent
as to general partnerships, however, it is difficult to believe that
even they would not be characterized as impersonal as to mem-
bership and activities so as to come within the rule that the
privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to the organi-
35 221 U.S. 361, 31 Sup.Ct. 538, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911).
36322 U.S. 694, 64 Sup.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1943).
37 Id. at 701, 64 Sup.Ct. at 1252, 88 L.Ed. at 1547.
38210 F.Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1963)
cert. den. 83 Sup.Ct. 1696 (1963).
39 314 F.2d at 791.
[Vol. 1, No. I
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zation's records. This would be especially true if the partnership
was formed under a state partnership statute.
The "required records" doctrine, discussed earlier, finds its
roots in the Wilson case, and undoubtedly is analogous to the
privilege against self-incrimination exception as to corporate or
association records held in a representative capacity. What re-
mains in doubt as to this residual visitation power of the state
as to group records is the definitional probelms inherent in the
terms "personal" and "representative of a non-privileged organi-
zation". During 1961 and 1962 a number of states passed statutes
permitting attorneys and physicians as well as other semi-profes-
sional persons to organize "professional corporations" for the prac-
tice of their professions. The passage of these statutes were
motiavted solely for the enjoyment of federal income tax ad-
vantages40 and their status is neither atypical of business corpor-
ations generally or unincorporated associations.
Is this the type of corporation that the Court had in mind in
the Wilson case? Perhaps not, but the transition is not difficult.
Even though the White case applied the Wilson doctrine to un-
incorporated associations and Silverstein to limited partnerships,
there nonetheless is considerable doubt whether informal partner-
ships of two or three partners common to attorneys, physicians,
dentists, accountants, etc. come within the definition of an or-
ganization of a character so impersonal in the scope of its mem-
bership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or repre-
sent purely private or personal interests of its constituents.
CONCLUSION
The practitioner representing taxpayers under investigation
or indictment for income tax evasion have a very narrow and
tortuous path to follow if they wish to avail their client protection
under the Fifth Amendmenfs self-incrimination privilege. Beset
with the question of who may plead the privilege plus the "re-
quired records" doctrine and the possibility of group records not
available for the protection the privilege has suffered substantial
erosion in a field that is becoming of wider importance.
There has been less of an emphasis on constitutional safe-
guards in the tax evasion field by the courts, even though as a
general rule taxpayers have been represented by extraordinarily
competent counsel. The sharpness and clear delineation of con-
stitutional issues in willful tax evasion cases is remarkable; one
only wishes that all persons accused of crimes could be afforded
the same oportunity of counsel. Undoubtedly some of the very
best decisions in the field of constitutional law are a result of
40 For an excellent presentation of the background and problems relating
to the enactment of state legislation in this area see Bittker, Professional As-
sociations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments, 17
TAx L. Riv. 1 (1961).
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criminal prosecution in tax evasion cases. This is due, at least
in good part, by the fact that as a general rule taxpayers are able
to afford top-notch counsel who in turn are able to pin-point
constitutional problems and elucidate far better than their cohorfs
who defend accused of the more prosaic crimes of murder, lar-
ceny, burglary, etc.
On the other hand the courts as a rule have been less per-
ceptive to pleas of taxpayers that their constitutional liberties
have been exposed to delimiting factors such as the "required
records" and group records doctrine.4' Certainly both the "required
records" doctrine and the group records approach are in for further
development as the courts become more aware of their exis-
tence. It is but a matter of time until the highest court is pre-
sented with the issue of whether an attorney can, on behalf of his
client, plead the privilege against self-incrimination. The attorney
should be aware of the uncertainties in this area and until more
definitive bench marks are set out in the form of decisions his will
be an uneasy path at best.
41 Indicative of this approach is the language of the Court in United
States v. White, 322 U.S. at 700, 64 Sup.Ct. ht 1252, 88 L.Ed. at 1547: "Tho
reason underlying the restriction of this constitutional privilege to natural in-
dividuals acting in their own private capacity is lear .... The greater portion
of evidence of wrongdoing by an organization or its representatives is usually
to be found in the official records and documents of that organization. Were
the cloak of the privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and
documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be
impossible."
W'ol. 1, No. I
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